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mental rotation effect. Other picture-plane correlations may be
used in other cases, to describe response times and other data
given as evidence for a mental process of rotation.
Where an operation of rotation was thought necessary to provide
a criterion for judging the identity of solid forms, these correlations
offer only a measure of similarity. Yet, such correlations might help
explain why response times to these picture pairs are unique rather
than bivalent (as an operation of rotation can proceed either the
shorter way around, or the long way). They might explain why re-
sponse times to views of solids paired with views of enantiomorphic
(left- and right-handed) solids increase linearly with depicted an-
gular difference. They might also explain why identical picture
pairs are associated with substantially lower response times than
picture pairs that represent a small rotation in space. These
changes in correlation may seem a nuisance, a confounding vari-
able in the search for a more complete characterization of the new
mental kinematics. On the other hand, such measures on the sur-
faces of picture pairs could account for most of the story. Correla-
tional measures (in contradistinction to invariants) may account for
the mental rotation effect in depth without recourse to interpreta-
tion of the pictures as representations of depth (see also Niall
1997). Such an approach promises a simple, concrete account of
some evidence in support of a kinematics of the mind.
The beauty of shepard’s proposal for a kinematics of the mind
is the dimly-reflected beauty of geometry, of invariants (i.e., the
beauty of group structure and the invariant theory of classical
kinematics). Yet we may not require that geometry of three di-
mensions to explain the experimental phenomena at hand. hecht
makes the astute claim that it is an empirical matter if invariants
or other candidate regularities of the environment provide a
model of some aspect of vision. hecht makes another point that
such invariants ought to be “non-trivial” – yet his and shepard’s
examples are trivial ones which confuse invariants with recurrent
environmental characteristics. Invariants are nothing like the di-
rection of illumination for a standing observer, the conservation of
water level, or else statistics over unspecified geometric proper-
ties. For a better account of invariants in the study of vision, see
Mundy et al. 1994.
todorovicˇ makes another strong point that our real knowledge
of kinematics is based on a capacity for idealization, different from
our ability to see. In contrast to Proffitt’s suggestion to kubovy &
epstein, one can say that motion often violates pure kinematics.
The friction of rough surfaces, the surface tension of fluids, and
many other physical effects underlie ordinary visible phenomena,
but do not enter into the idealizations of kinematics. Also, the de-
velopment of knowledge about kinematics itself is not a story of in-
ternalization: such a claim would fictionalize the history of science.
The development of kinematics is not a chapter in a psychology of
the individual, since the development of physics has supposed an
epistemological division of labor. It is not a chapter in the evolu-
tionary psychology of the species either, since organisms adapt to
existing local conditions, and not to counterfactual or universal con-
ditions. A psychology which fails to acknowledge the place of ideals
in its description of intellectual competence – including compe-
tence in kinematics – is a psychology which fails to draw a cogent
distinction between perception and thought.
The notion of an internalized kinematics addresses a funda-
mental problem in psychology – better said, the notion scratches a
deep conceptual itch. hecht claims that the notion solves one of
the hardest problems in the study of perception, the underspecifi-
cation problem. kubovy & epstein describe the inverse projec-
tion problem as fundamental to the problem of vision; the inverse
projection problem revisits the underspecification problem for vi-
sion. This problem is neither deep nor hard nor fundamental; its
conceptual itch is illusory – if anything, the problem is the result
of a deep confusion. (Kubovy & Epstein cite James Gibson (1979)
as calling it a “pseudoproblem.”) No solution involving an inter-
nalized kinematics is required where there exists no problem.
Some psychological phenomena like “mental rotation” may
arise as a consequence of the characteristics of illumination, or the
perspective geometry of pictures. shepard remarks that the evo-
lutionary significance of the invariant characteristics of light-
reflecting objects is primary to that of the characteristics of light
or light sources. Yet for vision, the invariants preserved and the
variants generated in the propagation of light are primary to other
“invariants” of light-reflecting objects – those which are not pre-
served when reflected light reaches our eyes. Of course we might
prefer to expound the psychology of representation without any
detour of discourse about the senses, including the sense of sight.
But “in the acutal use of expressions we make detours, we go by
sideroads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course 
we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed” (Wittgenstein
1953/1967, p. 127e).
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Abstract: Kubovy and Epstein distinguish between systems that follow
rules, and those that merely instantiate them. They regard compliance
with the principles of kinematic geometry in apparent motion as a case of
instantiation. There is, however, some reason to believe that the human vi-
sual system internalizes the principles of kinematic geometry, even if it
does not explicitly represent them. We offer functional resemblance as a
criterion for internal representation.
[kubovy & epstein]
According to kubovy & epstein (k&e), there are two ways of
construing the fact that the perceived paths of apparently moving
objects conform to the principles of kinematic geometry (Shepard
1994, pp. 4–6). One might suppose, with shepard, that our vi-
sual system proceeds by applying internal knowledge of kinematic
geometry. Alternatively, one might suppose, as k&e urge, that our
visual system proceeds as if it possessed knowledge of kinematic
geometry. The latter is always an option, say k&e, because of the
difference between physical devices that follow rules and those
that merely instantiate them (see target article, p. 619). Although
k&e don’t elaborate, their supporting discussion suggests they
have in mind the well known distinction between physical systems
whose behaviour is driven by internally represented rules (such as
stored program digital computers) and those whose behaviour
merely conforms to rules/laws, without internally representing
them (the approximate conformity of the planets to Newton’s uni-
versal law of gravitation is the standard example). There is, how-
ever, some reason to believe that the human visual system does not
merely instantiate the principles of kinematic geometry. Conse-
quently, if the visual system does behave in accordance with these
principles, as k&e concede, it must internally represent them in
some way. We will argue for this view by briefly re-examining the
distinction between rule-following and rule instantiation.
The paradigm case of a device whose behaviour is driven by rep-
resented rules – of rule-following – is the Turing machine. The
causal operation of a Turing machine is entirely determined by the
tokens written on the machine’s tape together with the configura-
tion of the machine’s read/write head. One of the startling features
of a Turing machine is that the machine’s tape can be used not only
to store data to be manipulated, but also to explicitly represent the
computational rules according to which this manipulation occurs.
This is the basis of stored program digital computers and the pos-
sibility of a Universal Turing machine (one which can emulate the
behaviour of any other Turing machine).
This neat picture gets a little messy, however, when we consider
that not all of the computational rules that drive the behaviour of
a Turing machine can be explicitly represented in the form of to-
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kens written on the machine’s tape. At the very least, there must
be some primitive rules or instructions built into the system in a
nonexplicit fashion, these residing in the machine’s read/write
head. Since these “hardwired” rules are not encoded in the form
of discrete tokens written on the machine’s tape, many theorists
claim that they are tacitly represented (see, e.g., Cummins 1986;
Dennett 1982; O’Brien & Opie 1999; Pylyshyn 1984). But what li-
censes this terminology? Is there any real difference between the
behaviour of a Turing machine driven by “tacitly represented”
rules and a planet obeying Newton’s laws?
We think there is. Consider a Turing machine that adds inte-
gers. Such a machine receives as input a set of tokens represent-
ing the numbers to be added, and eventually produces further to-
kens representing their sum. Since the sequence of tokens on the
machine’s tape (representing both summands and sums) is a set of
discrete physical objects, the Turing machine’s operation can be
characterised in terms of a pattern of causal relations among its 
tokens. From this perspective, the Turing machine succeeds in
adding numbers because the causal relations among its inputs and
outputs, considered as physical objects, mirror the numerical re-
lations among sums and summands. The computational power of
the Turing machine thus depends on the existence of a homo-
morphism between an empirical relational structure (in this case
a causal one) and a mathematical relational structure, as k&e
would put it (sect. 2.1, p. 621). We will characterise the relation-
ship between the system of tape tokens and the integers as one of
functional resemblance. One system functionally resembles an-
other when the pattern of causal relations among the objects in
the first system preserves or mirrors at least some of the relations
among the objects in the second (for further discussion see
O’Brien & Opie, forthcoming).
If, by virtue of the causal relations among its internal states, a
physical system functionally resembles some domain D, then in our
view it is appropriate to interpret the mechanisms that drive the sys-
tem as internal representations of the relations between the objects
in D. In the case of our imagined Turing machine, D is the (abstract)
domain of integers, which are subject to various arithmetic rela-
tions, including those codified in the rules of addition. Conse-
quently, it’s appropriate to interpret the Turing machine as em-
bodying internally represented rules of numerical addition. It does
not matter whether the Turing machine explicitly represents these
rules in the form of tokens written on its tape, or tacitly represents
them courtesy of the configuration of its read/write head. What
matters is that the casual relations among some of its internal states
mirror specific mathematical relations among the integers.
Functional resemblance serves to distinguish devices like the
Turing machine, which represent rules, from other physical sys-
tems that merely conform to rules. In the case of the solar system,
for example, while the motions of the planets respect Kepler’s
laws, which can in turn be derived from Newton’s universal law of
gravitation, there is little sense to be made of the idea that these
laws are internally represented by the system. Such laws are actu-
ally our attempt to represent (in mathematically tractable form)
the regularities inherent in the causal dynamics of the system.
Thus, when we simulate the planetary motions on a digital com-
puter, we arrange things so that the causal relations among some
of the internal states of the computer mirror the geometric and
dynamical relations among the planets. The functional resem-
blance runs from simulation to planetary system, not the other way
around. We are thereby warranted in saying that the inherent
gravitational constraints of the solar system are represented in the
computer, but not that the solar system represents the laws of mo-
tion – it merely instantiates them (to use k&e’s language).
What, then, of the human visual system’s conformity to the prin-
ciples of kinematic geometry, at least where the behaviour of ap-
parently moving objects is concerned? Here it would seem that a
relationship of functional resemblance does obtain between in-
ternal states of the human visual system and the motions of ob-
jects in the world. Of course, we don’t yet know which brain pro-
cesses are responsible for producing experiences of apparent
motion. But it is reasonable to infer that the causal processes in-
volved are systematically related to the structure of the experi-
ences themselves. Such experiences portray objects that are sub-
ject to the kinds of constraints identified by Shepard, namely, they
are conserved, are restricted to movements in two or three di-
mensions, and traverse kinematically simple paths (Shepard 1994,
pp. 4–6). By assumption, these constraints are mirrored in the
causal relations among the neural vehicles of apparent motion:
there is a functional resemblance (if not an isomorphism) between
brain states and perceived paths. Although real objects do not in-
variably move in accordance with kinematic constraints, the mo-
tions delimited by those constraints certainly constitute a class of
possible object motions. Indeed, motions defined with respect to
axes of symmetry are common in the context of manual object ma-
nipulation. By the transitivity of resemblance, we thus establish
that there is a functional resemblance between the system of in-
ternal vehicles responsible for experiences of apparent motion
and the motions of real objects acting under kinematic constraints.
In light of our earlier discussion, this suggests that we may regard
the visual system as representing the principles of kinematic
geometry, not merely instantiating them.
Even if the principles of kinematic geometry are not explicitly
encoded by the visual system, it therefore appears that kinematic
principles are “lodged in the mind” (k&e, p. 619). Kinematic con-
straints are built into the very fabric of the visual system. They are
not merely “passive guarantors or underwriters that are external
to the perceptual process,” but “active constituents in the percep-
tual process” (ibid.) (at least under the stimulus conditions that
give rise to apparent motion). In other words, we must reject
k&e’s modest interpretation of shepard’s observations, leaving
Shepard’s own conclusion: kinematic constraints are internally
represented, because they have been “internalized” by the brain.
The mathematics of symmetry does not
provide an appropriate model for the human
understanding of elementary motions
John R. Pani
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Louisville,
Louisville, KY 40292. jrpani@louisville.edu
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Abstract: Shepard’s article presents an impressive application of the math-
ematics of symmetry to the understanding of motion. However, there are
basic psychological phenomena that the model does not handle well. These
include the importance of the orientations of rotational motions to salient
reference systems for the understanding of the motions. An alternative
model of the understanding of rotations is sketched.
[shepard]
In even the most elementary domains of physical understanding,
there are clear distinctions between problems that are natural and
intuitive for people, and ones that are challenging. These phe-
nomena extend into many areas of cognition, including spatial or-
ganization, object recognition, and event knowledge; and expla-
nation of this variation in physical understanding is an important
undertaking for cognitive theory.
In the first part of his article, shepard constructs an explana-
tion of variation in our understanding of elementary motion from
the modern mathematics of symmetry. In this view, our under-
standing of motion is embodied in a six-dimensional manifold, and
those motions that are natural for us to perceive or imagine are the
geodesics in the manifold; the structure of the manifold, and the
lengths of the geodesics in it, are reduced when the objects that
move are rotationally symmetric. This geometric model is an im-
pressive achievement, and it appears to represent a thorough ex-
ploration of the application of this mathematics to spatial cogni-
tion. Despite containing important elements of truth, however, I
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